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Article
Red Banking: Chinese State-Owned
Commercial Bank Reform and the Basel II
Accord
Christopher D. Luehr*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In October 2008, China celebrated the 60th anniversary of
the founding of the People’s Republic of China.1 The celebration
at Tiananmen Square featured many familiar staples of the
National Day ceremony—soldiers marching in perfect unison,
children performing traditional Chinese dances, and countless
displays of affection for “the Great Helmsman,” Mao Zedong.2
Despite the fanfare, one wonders that if Mao were aware of the
changes that have taken place in the Communist empire he
built, he might turn over in his glass-encased grave. On
National Day, young people don Mao hats adorned with red
stars, but outside these celebrations they are more likely to
wear baseball caps with Nike swooshes. The Central Chinese
Communist Party (CCCP) still maintains power, but the
fundamental tenets of the party that Mao established have been
massaged or have given way to modern ideas of free market and
personal wealth. Though the “Five Star Red Flag” Mao hoisted
on the first National Day in 1949 still waves over “Red China,”
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A., Columbia
University, 2005; B.A., Macalester College, 2001. The author thanks the editors and
staff of the MJIL for their dedication and assistance improving this article. He also
thanks his family and friends who supported him during the writing process.
1. Michael Wines, On Day for Chinese Pride, Little Interest in Ideology, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at A10.
2. See Sharon LaFraniere, No Detail Is Overlooked as China Prepares to
Celebrate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A4; See also Emily Rauhala, Mao: The
Great Helmsman of Kitsch?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/world/asia/01iht-mao.html (discussing the
variety of Mao Zedong memorabilia for sale).
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the country is significantly less “red” than it was sixty years
ago.3
The financial reforms that occurred since the “Opening Up”
period of the 1980s have ushered in a new era of market
capitalism in the former communist stronghold.4 The difficulties
accompanying these massive changes have shifted the economy
even farther from its centrally-planned roots and the transition
continues to send ripples through the domestic and
international economies.5 Not surprisingly, this movement
necessitated sweeping changes in the banking system.6 The
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) dominate the country’s
financial landscape due in part to their fifty-four percent
ownership of all banking assets in China.7 The SOCBs also
share a special relationship with the Central Government and
often play the dual and sometimes conflicting roles of test pilot
and mouthpiece for new regulations.8 One such set of
regulations implements the recommendations of the Basel
Committee, an international body established in 1974 “to
enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve
the quality of banking supervision worldwide.”9 The latest

3. 1949: Highlight of the PRC Founding Ceremony, CHINACULTURE.ORG,
http://www.chinaculture.org/focus/2009-09/09/content_347434.htm (last visited Sept.
24, 2010).
4. See Douglas Zhihua Zeng, China’s Employment Challenges and Strategies
After the WTO Accession, (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3522, 2005) (discussing
the growing economy since entrance into the WTO).
5. Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 399, 415–16 (2002).
6. See YUANYUAN PENG, THE CHINESE BANKING INDUSTRY 29–36 (2007)
(noting that in recent years several prominent state-owned commercial banks
suffered corruption scandals, some of which effected transactions with banks around
the world).
7. See Yan Li & Yumin Zhuang, The Reform of State-Owned Commercial
Banks in China, Presentation at ASEAN+3 Workshop on Reform and Development
of Banking System in China (May 24–26, 2005), available at
http://www.afdc.org.cn/afdc/cn/UploadFile/200932535829469.ppt [hereinafter
Zhuang & Li, Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks] (presentation containing
asset percentage statistics distributed by the People’s Bank of China).
8. Two of the main banks were the country’s first to engage in international
transactions, and more recently have been the first subjected to new capital
adequacy requirements. See INST. OF FIN. & BANKING, CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCIS.,
CHINA’S BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE INTERNAL RESEARCH REPORTER OF
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT 74–76 (Li Yang & Robert Kuhn eds., 2007).
9. About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
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regulations, the “International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards” (Basel II), set forth
provisions for assessing risk and calculating capital adequacy.10
The seemingly narrow measurement belies the great complexity
of the resulting provisions and their broad influence on the
banking world in China and worldwide.
This Article seeks to explore the implications of Basel II not
only on the SOCBs’ capital adequacy but also their corporate
governance. The background section tracks the evolution of
SOCBs over the last couple decades, while also looking at the
Central Government’s historical approaches to international
standards. Section I of the analysis explains how the specificity
of Basel II’s capital adequacy requirements will create stronger
capital assets and diminish instances of bank corruption among
SOCB managers.11 In Section II, the supervisory review
requirements are shown to advance China’s recent pursuit of
stronger corporate governance practices. Section III explores
how the nonbinding international standards engendered a new
legal framework in China for regulating banks even before the
standards themselves were adopted as law. The final section
posits that China’s interest in greater global economic power
will compel full compliance with international regulations,
evidenced by their accelerated implementation of Basel II.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE-OWNED
COMMERCIAL BANKS
A. COMMUNIST BANKING PRACTICES AND EARLY REFORMS
The history of China in the twentieth century and the
important changes in the twenty-first reflect the intimate
relationship between law, politics and economics in the Middle
Kingdom. The twentieth century saw China’s government move
from imperialism to fragile democracy to communism, the last of
which has undergone major reforms since the founding of the

10. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, at Introduction, ¶¶ 1,
4–7 (June 2004) [hereinafter Basel II].
11. For a discussion of recent fraud committed by upper level SOCB managers,
see PENG, supra note 6, at 29–36.
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People’s Republic of China in 1949.12 Each political transition
brought new thoughts and different economic systems, which
directly influenced banking practices and the legal regulation
thereof.13 The movement back and forth between centralization
and diversification illustrates the ideological shifts regarding
Chinese banking and the attendant changes in corporate
governance.14 During the first decade of Communist rule, the
government consolidated all banking control under the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC).15 The PBOC managed all banking and
monetary policy throughout the entire country.16 While the
PBOC remained the sole bank in the country for a number of
years, eventually the National People’s Congress formed three
other large state-owned commercial banks—the China
Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the
Industrial and Commercial Banks of China—creating what is
now called “The Big Four.”17 The Big Four’s main purpose was
to fund the policies of the Central Planning Committee, and in
this sense, they did not operate like modern banks at all.
Instead of managing risks, incentivizing savings, or performing
other financial services, these institutions essentially served as
state credit-granting agencies blindly funding government
projects.18
During the early decades of Communist rule in China, the
Central Government dominated corporate governance in all
companies, including the banking industry.19 During this time,
corporate governance took the form of the Central Government
handing out marching orders to Communist party officials
serving as owners, supervisors, managers, and creditors of
12. See generally, Duncan, supra note 5, at 402–06, 411–30 (highlighting recent
changes in the Chinese legislative and administrative systems).
13. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM IN POST-WTO CHINA 14–15
(James R. Barth et al. eds., 2007) (tracking the changes in SOCBs since the days of
Mao’s rule). [hereinafter FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING].
14. Id. (explaining the strong central control of the People’s Bank of China and
subsequent diversification and recentralization over the past couple decades).
15. HAIQUN YANG, BANKING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL IN REFORMING PLANNED
ECONOMIES 13 (1996).
16. Id.
17. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING , supra note 13, at 10, 12; ZHONGFEI ZHOU,
BANKING LAWS IN CHINA, at xxi (2007).
18. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 10–11.
19. See Yuwa Wei, An Overview of Corporate Governance in China, 30
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 23, 29 (2003) (discussing the Communist
nationalization of corporations and death of private ownership).
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businesses.20 Eventually, many problems arose from this
centrally-planned system.21 In addition to the problems of the
State assuming several conflicting roles, there was a general
absence of discipline or incentive mechanisms for state-run
companies to maximize economic efficiency.22
Without legal ramifications for shirking fiduciary duties,
managers focused more on lining their own pockets, and thus,
allowed their banks to approve extremely high risk loans to
those who could provide political favors.23 Also, knowledge that
the central government would simply issue more loans if ever
they faced economic hardship undercut any motivation for the
banks to increase productivity or profit.24 Concentrating control
over the SOCBs in the Central Committee mirrored the
philosophy upon which the country was founded, but the
practical application proved less than satisfactory.25
The chronic lack of efficiency and achievement during the
early decades of the People’s Republic of China lead the once
staunchly communist regime to rethink its methods.26 The
result was the “Opening Up” period, the gradual economic
liberation that began under the leadership of Deng Xiaopeng in
1978.27 During this period China took its first shaky steps away
from centrally-planned economics and toward the increasingly
integrated world of free trade.28 Recognizing the need to
embrace the free market in order to build a stronger nation,
China reformed many of its economic policies and moved toward
20.
21.

Id. at 32.
See HAIQUN YANG, BANKING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL IN REFORMING
PLANNED ECONOMIES 21–24 (1996) (generalizing that all centrally controlled
economies eventually fall victim to the similar patterns of low profitability and
subpar production levels); ZHONGFEI ZHOU, BANKING LAWS IN CHINA, at xx–xxii
(2007) (explaining the chronic inefficiency and underperformance for SOCBs and
other state-owned enterprises).
22. Wei, supra note 19, at 32–33. See also PENG, supra note 6, at 8-108–10
(discussing conflicting roles and other problems facing state-owned
banks).banks).banks).
23. See PENG, supra note 6, at 3, 29–31 (discussing bribery and fraud in
Chinese banks and detailing the specific case of issuing risky loans in the BOC
Shanghai branch).
24. Id. at 12–13.
25. See id. at 7 (“[S]tate-owned banks are facing daunting challenges . . . .”).
26. See Wei, supra note 19, at 30 (discussing economic reforms and
corporatization during the 1970s and 1980s).
27. See INST. OF FIN. & BANKING, supra note 8, at 3.
28. See generally NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL & WUDUNN, CHINA WAKES:
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER (1994).
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privatization.29 In the banking world, this lead to tentative
liberalization and diversification including a more limited role
for the PBOC, and the creation of the other three state banks,
which were eventually allowed to run as fully-functioning
businesses.30 Throughout the 1980s, the government slowly gave
banks more agency over their business dealings, which allowed
the institutions to grow and set up local branches throughout
the nation.31 The incremental reform ushered in the first wave
of Chinese economic growth, during which industries and banks
flung off the shackles of government control, or at least enjoyed
a slightly longer leash.32 The creation of the new, free enterprise
system demanded a new legal framework that would allow the
government to maintain strong control while giving businesses
more freedom.33 In 1986, the Central Government’s State
Council issued the “Provisional Regulations on the Control of
Banks,” the first comprehensive legislation regulating the
Chinese banking industry.34 Yet, the first round of reforms only
mitigated, and did not eliminate, the problems that plagued the
early communist-era industries.35
B. ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE MID-90S REFORMS
As China’s influence and economy grew, so too did the
demand for further reform of the financial system.36 The banks
could not support the rapid liberalization and privatization that
both lead China to this period of relative prosperity and were

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
See PENG, supra note 6, at 13.
Id. at 14–15.
SeeYANG, supra note 15, at 67 (discussing independence of central banks
during transition).
33. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 16 (explaining the new
banking regulations following the enactment of the PBOC).
34. Provisional Regulations on the Control of Banks (promulgated by the State
Council, Jan. 7, 1986, effective Jan. 7, 1986) ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST.(China),
available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/protcob477/.
35. See Zhongfei Zhou & Jingwei Li, In Search of Approaches to Improving
Corporate Governance in China's State-Owned Commercial Banks, 36 INT’L LAW.
215, 224–25 (2002) (forming sound corporate governance as an issue still plaguing
banks today).
36. See Lawrence L. C. Lee, Adoption and Application of a "Soft Law" Banking
Supervisory Framework Based on the Current Basle Accords to the Chinese Economic
Area, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 687, 687–88 (1997)7 (growing financial markets in general
necessitate increased supervision).
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pushing it toward greater growth.37 Free from the constraints of
policy lending, the Big Four state-owned commercial banks now
needed to rework their own internal structures in order to
continue their aggressive pursuit of modernized banking
practices and the related goal of accession to the WTO.38
This began with centralizing the structure which had
previously let local branches operate too far outside the control
of the PBOC.39 One such problem was the habit of many local
officials essentially using the state-owned banks as local policy
banks, which in turn lead to a great increase in the percentage
of non-performing loans taken on by the local branches.40 These
and other troubles spurred the government to pass a second
wave of banking laws in China in the mid-90s, the “Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China” and
the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial
Banking.”41 While this eliminated the agency problems at the
local level, the laws were vague and lacked the strength
necessary to instill proper corporate governance in the SOCBs
from the top down.42
While the historic passing of the banking laws constituted a
large step toward industry reform, the decade would bring more
warnings that the system needed further reform to fully realize
its potential. The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 provided a
37. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 9–11 (discussing the
evolution of banking system due to globalization and shift to market economy).
38. Id. at 12–13.
39. Id. at 10–11, 15. Cf. CHINA’S FINANCIAL TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADS 87
(Charles W. Calomiris ed., 2007) (stating that China’s recentralization is the cause
of their economic troubles).
40. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 13–14 (discussing
inefficient lending practices by local banking institutions).
41. See id. at 16–17 (noting the promulgation of the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China and Law People’s Republic of China
on Commercial Banking); Zhonghuá rénmín gònghéguó zhongguó rénmíng yínháng
fa (中华人民共和国中国人民银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the
People’s Bank of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 18, 1995, effective Mar. 18, 1995)
http://www.isinolaw.com/isinolaw/detail_ce.jsp?iscatalog=0&statutes_id=131692&ch
annelid=76608&skind=110&catalogid= (China); Zhonghuá rénmín gònghéguó
shangyè yínháng fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995)
http://www.isinolaw.com/isinolaw/detail_ce.jsp?iscatalog=0&statutes_id=131692&ch
annelid=76608&skind=110&catalogid= (China).
42. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 16–19 (noting specific
weaknesses in the newly promulgated laws).
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wake-up call for the entire region, including the Chinese
government leaders.43 The Chinese took stock of their current
financial sector and realized that further reforms were
necessary to avoid the problems that crippled their Asian
neighbors.44 Thus, after a period of recentralization, China
began to diversify its financial practices, always keeping an eye
on WTO.45
Important reforms during this time included the
introduction of the asset liability management system, which
replaced the old credit planning system still lingering from the
early communist days.46 Also, as part of the plan to gain
credibility in the eyes of the WTO members, the government
improved its banks’ capital adequacy by complying with the first
Basel Committee’s “The International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards,” or Basel II.47 Compliance
here necessitated an injection of 270 billion renminbi
(approximately $39 billion USD) into the SOCBs. This measure
along with the other reforms implemented by the PRC,
eventually helped China gain accession into the WTO.48
C. ENTERING THE FREY: WTO ACCESSION AND POST-WTO
REFORMS
43. See PENG, supra note 6, at 1 (noting the effect the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis had on the policies and attitude with respect to financial regulations amongst
China’s leadership).
44. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 20.
45. Id. (discussing a series of administrative regulations that took place to
bring Chinese regulations in line with international standards); Raj Bhala, Enter the
Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469,
1491–92 (2000) (discussing the conflict between China’s SOEs and banks and the
initiative taken by the PRC to remedy this conflict in order to appeal to the WTO, in
particular the United States, which was already a sitting member of the WTO and it
did not approve of China’s SOE policies).
46. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 15; See Lee, supra note 36, at
729 (discussing the need for China to develop a more stable banking system since it
will serve as the foundation for China’s future economic development).
47. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 124 (discussing China’s
implementation of Basel as part of its larger measure to place its bank system in
line with international standards); See also Basel II, supra note 10, at Introduction,
¶ 1–4 (discussing implementation of framework to measure capital and determine
capital adequacy).
48. See ZHOU, supra note 17, at xxi (discussing issuance of special government
bonds to recapitalize the big four to end the dependence of SOEs on government
subsidies); Bhala, supra note 45, at 1481 (noting the demands made by the WTO of
the PRC to become a working member, specifically the issue of government subsidies
to SOEs).
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In a reverse of the early communist era stance, the
government made the previously mentioned reforms in the late
1990s to make the country more competitive and better able to
engage other countries on the world stage.49 An important
transition in that process has been the changes made to gain
acceptance into the WTO.50 China’s accession and the resulting
consequence provide a helpful background against which to
compare the Basel II framework and how its implementation
faces similar successes and difficulties.51
Though China made great strides in reforming its banking
system to gain accession into the WTO, their accession
nevertheless came with several strings attached.52 In an
unprecedented move evidenced by the lack of trust the
international community still held toward China and its
banking system (particularly in the area of reliable corporate
finance and enforceable legal sanctions), the WTO designed a
Transitional Review Mechanism (“TRM”) specifically for China.
53 The fairly strict TRM called for annual meetings during
China’s initial eight years “protection period,” during which
China had to answer questions and challenges brought by other
members.54 With the “probationary period” soon coming to an
end55,China now has the opportunity to show the world that it is
capable of solely regulating its economy, specifically its financial
sector, under the strict standards of the international
community.56
49. See ZHOU & LI, supra note 35, at xix n.2 (noting the PRC’s awareness that
financial reforms need to be implemented); PENG, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the
need for China to reform its bank, especially in light of poor financial reviews from
prominent international financial corporations).
50. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Accession
of the People’s Republic of China: Decision of Nov. 10, 2001, WT/21/432 (Nov. 23,
2001) [hereinafter WTO Protocol] (listing financial changes China must make in
order to gain full membership into the WTO); Bhala, supra note 45, at 1474
(discussing the purpose and significance of the provisions enumerated in the
protocol).
51. See PENG, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the use of business history, which
is the study of the operation and administration of business in the past, to explain
and guide present and future business operations).
52. See generally WTO Protocol, supra note 50 (listing fulfilling obligations
required of China in order for it to become a working member of the WTO).
53. Id. at § 18; FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 117.
54. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 119–20.
55. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, § 18(4) (stating that the TRM will only be
in effect for the first eight years of China’s memberships).
56. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, § 18(4) (stating that the TRM will only be
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Part of this determination depends on the actions of the
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) and its
ability to use the legal power granted to it by the government
and distance itself from the sometimes domineering presence of
the Chinese Central Communist Party.57 While the government
itself acknowledges “the distance between international [Basel]
standards and the effectiveness of CBRC has noticeably
decreased,” it still recognizes a distance remains.58 While
complete compliance with the Basel II Revised Framework
remains the goal, the question not often asked is whether full
compliance will remedy the problems still troubling China’s
financial system in general and the banking system in
particular.59
Basel II sets out a standardized framework for banks, with
a major push for uniform adequate capitalization standards.60
While the Second Pillar of the Basel II explicitly deals with the
supervisory framework, the underlying philosophy of Basel II is
that the capitalization standards serve as both a measuring
stick for judging a bank manager’s risk management, and the
punishing stick if they consequently fall below the prescribed
levels.61 With a uniform measuring standard, nations will be
better able to oversee their internal banking systems. Also,
investors will be able to use the same measure to determine
what banks are solid investment prospects or judge how well a
nation is maintaining its domestic banking system.62
in effect for the first eight years of China’s memberships).
57. See Wang Zhaoxing, China’s Banking Industry; Moving Forward in Accord
with Reform & Opening, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES
AND GLOBAL IMPACT 73, 82–84 (Zhu Min, Cai Jinqing & Martha Avery eds., 2009)
(discussing CBRC’s implementation of programs with little to no interference from
the CCCP).
58. Id. at 83.
59. Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, When Basle II Doesn’t Work:
Contingency Rules versus Fixed Requirements, THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY 3 (Feb.
12,
2002),
http://www.econometricsociety.org/meetings/esem02/cdrom/papers/952/NoteBankCo
mp3.pdf (“[I]n a complete information setting . . . the outcomes under the new Basle
II capital adequacy framework will be Pareto inferior to the outcomes when a
regulator assesses the risks in the asset portfolio of a bank and subsequently
prescribes it a fixed CAR.”)
60. Basel II, supra note 10, at Introduction, ¶ 4.
61. Id. at Pillar II, ¶ 719–21 (discussing the applicable uses and purpose of
creating a supervisory framework).
62. See id. at Introduction, ¶ 4 (noting that the underlying purpose and use of
Basel regulations will help domestic banking systems and international
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With respect to the supervisory review process, Basel II
places the onus on bank management to develop transparent
and systematic methods for assessing risk.63 The framework
lists numerous factors that banks should use in developing
these internal measuring devices, which should lead to greater
uniformity across international banking systems.64 These
factors and the framework as a whole have been revised in light
of the recent global financial crisis.65 The revisions place greater
emphasis on avoiding concentration of risk in specific market
sectors,66 which is a problem that already plagues the Chinese
financial system.67 In this instance, similar to China’s relatively
unscathed escape from the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s,
China’s problems proved to be its protection.68 Because it lacked
financial complexity and limited international investment,
China’s separation from the outside world reduced its liability
when the U.S. market began to plummet.69
Though China has made much about its accelerated
schedule for implementing the Basel II accord, it has been
relatively silent on the exact measures it will take to implement
the new framework, still not having released the specific 2009
regulations to the public.70 An analysis of Basel II, however,
provides a basis for analysis as to its effectiveness in reforming

investments).
63. Id. at Pillar II, ¶ 721.
64. Id.
65. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revision to the Basel II
Market Risk Framework ¶ 1 (July 2009) [hereinafter Basel II Revisions] (noting that
the old framework did not take into account key risks, which the new framework
does take into account).
66. Id. § V, ¶ 21(9)(c).
67. See Elizabeth Ho, Article, The International Effects of the Credit Crisis, 28
Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 102, 110 (2009) (noting China’s heavy reliance on one
particular sector, exports and manufactured goods).
68. See id. (noting that China’s conservative fiscal policies and heavy
investments in one sector kept its economy safe from the international credit crisis).
69. Id.
70. See Samuel Shen, Update 1 – China Chooses 7 Banks for Basel II Rules –
Sources, Reuters (Mar. 3, 2009, 6:12AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSHA35421220090303 (noting that China wants
to have banks implementing Basel II by the end of 2010); A search of rules and
regulations that mention the term “bank regulations” five sources from 2009
concerning bank regulations were retrieved. The available regulations neither
mention Basel II nor resemble Basel II’s general framework for capitalization
regulatory. The search, conducted September 27, 2010, is in the “iSinolaw Primary
Resources” database, with a general keyword search of the term “bank regulations.”
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Chinese banking corporate governance.71 Again, lack of
transparency remains an issue.72 Furthermore, as with much
international law, the Basel II accord provides few specifics as
to how transgressions and failures to comply should be dealt
with, either domestically or internationally.73 Though some will
claim that the market will right itself in regards to inadequate
capital levels in banks, there are still dangers for noncompliance
with such widespread standards.74 The current global economic
crisis highlights the interconnectedness of the economies of
disparate nations.75 With regard to China, failure to develop a
strong legal system with which to enforce the standards laid out
in Basel II could lead to trouble worldwide.76
D. CREATING THE CHINESE BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION
In order to better regulate the banking industry and
improve the legal framework, while preventing the government
from directly interfering with the business of banking, the
National People’s Congress (NPC) created the Chinese Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC)–a supervisory body with
powers to regulate the evolving banking world.77 It is no
71. See Kevin S. Buehler, Vijay D’Silva & Gunner Pritsch, The Business Case
for Basel II, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Feb. 2004),
http://mkqpreview1.qdweb.net/Financial_Services/Banking/The_business_case_for_
Basel_II_1396 (discussing the use of the frameworks mentioned in Basel II as an
analytical tool to hypothetically assess credit, market and operational risk, and how
banks in turn should respond to such measurements).
72. See PENG, supra note 6, at 4 (noting the issue of transparency with Chinese
governance).
73. See generally Basel II, supra note 10 (noting that Basel II provides a
general supervisory process for domestic regulation and compliance measures, but in
the end, largely relegates the duty of ensuring compliance, through the creation of a
supervisory process, in the hands of bank supervisors).
74. Goksel Tiryaki, Basel Regulations, Economic Capital and Their
Implications for the Turkish Banking Industry, 10(1) DOGUS UNIVERSITESI DERGISI
J. 118,119–20 (2009), www.dwlogic.com/community/articles/Basel_Turkey.pdf.
75. But see Ho, supra note 67, at 102 (discussing that globalization and its
accompanying effects is a misleading theory, because of the growing economic
heterogeneity of different countries).
76. See id. at 110 (“In fact, China has become an attractive option for foreign
direct investment within the last year as the full effects of the credit crisis have
emerged.”); See also FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 22 (noting the
success foreign banks have had in China after WTO accession, and the positive
effect promulgations of rules and regulations have had on foreign involvement).
77. See Pieter Bottelier, The Evolution of Banking and Finance in China:
Domestic & International Aspects, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS:
CHALLENGES & GLOBAL IMPACT 53, 57 (Zhu Min, Cai Jinqing & Martha Avery eds.,
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coincidence that the creation came in the same year that the
main Chinese banking laws were amended, and the year before
a revised Basel II was released.78 Furthering the development of
modernized banks, the NPC realized the need to divest the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) of its regulatory duties for two
important reasons. Firstly, in order to focus on developing more
complex financial services and improve its ability to compete on
an international level, the PBOC could not also be burdened
with the responsibility of creating, implementing, and
regulating banking policy for the whole country.79 Secondly,
since the Central Government remained the majority
stockholder in the PBOC, agency issues arose as to whether the
bank could both monitor itself and others, in keeping with the
regulatory goals of the government, while still attempting to be
a competitive business, demanded by the government as
primary stockholder.80
The creation of the CBRC accomplished both of these goals.
By assuming the regulatory responsibilities formerly held by the
PBOC, the CBRC relieves the bank of those concerns.81 More
importantly, with its sole charge being banking regulation, the
CBRC is better able to focus on that task and is therefore more
efficient
in
designing,
implementing,
and
enforcing
regulations.82 Also, as a regulatory body and not a state-owned
business, the CBRC holds a different relationship with the
Central Government.83 While it is still controlled by the
government in the sense that it acts as a branch of the NPC, its
goals and mission focus solely on regulation.84 The CBRC
accomplishes these goal through disseminating regulations and
guidelines, which have the same legally binding force as
congressionally-approved statutes.85 Through these regulations
2009) (noting establishment of an independent banking regulator).
78. See generally Id.; Basel II, supra note 10; Joseph J. Norton, Forward to
ZHONGFEI ZHOU, BANKING LAWS IN CHINA ix, xi (Kluwer Law Int’l 2007) (noting
2003 amendments).
79. Bottelier, supra note 77, at 57.
80. See Zhuang, Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, supra note 7.
81. See Bottelier, supra note 77, at 57 (noting that by assuming the regulatory
responsibilities formerly held by the PBOC, the CBRC relieves the PBOC of those
concerns, allowing it to focus more on other matters).
82. Zhaoxing, supra note 57, at 82.
83. Id.
84. Id. (noting that the commission’s purpose is to properly supervise the
banking industry).
85. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing the broad
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the Commission effects changes including overseeing the
implementing of the Basel II framework, which occurred
primarily in two phases.86
III. “VOLUNTARY” COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
China is moving away from its communist roots and into
the international free market at a time where globalization is
compelling the development of new requirements and standards
for all countries, including those who have participated in the
global market for centuries. This places a new comer to the
global market like China in a unique position to create a freemarket system that complies with emerging international
standards.
The largest challenge for China is building a reputation
that other countries can trust.87 Increased investor confidence
leads to increased investments, which leads to a stronger
economy.88 Though countries are already eager to invest despite
problems such as corruption and government interference, an
open China with a trustworthy banking system would lead to an
even stronger Chinese economy.89 Especially given the
government’s reluctance to alter policies such as floating the
yuan and its history of policy loans and “meddling” with the
banking system, voluntary implementation reveals an
encouraging change in China’s approach to the global economy.
Basel II assists the SOCBs in strengthening their economic
performance and reputational reliability through highly detailed
and practice-oriented requirements and, perhaps surprisingly,
through heavy reliance on self-regulation.

regulatory powers of the CBRC, which largely draw from powers formerly held by
the PBOC).
86. See id. at 21 (discussing the CBRC’s role in overseeing the implementation
of Basel II).
87. See Zhou, supra note 35, at 217 (“[C]orruption, and the like have been
frequently described as characteristics of the four biggest wholly state-owned
commercial banks.”)
88. See Busy Week Ahead for U.S. Markets Amid Important Fundamentals,
ecPulse, Sep. 26, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 19128413 (noting the relationship
between investor confidence and investments).
89. See Lee, supra note 36, at 692 (claiming that an efficient financial sector
will lead to economic growth and development).
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A. BASEL II’S FRAMEWORK STRENGTHENS SOCB PERFORMANCE
AND MITIGATES SOCB PROBLEMS
Basel II provides specific provisions for calculating
minimum capital requirements, designing proper risk
management strategies and implementing sound supervisory
review processes.90 The level of detail provided by the Basel
Committee reflects the collective work of banking experts from
around the world who have repeatedly tested and revised the
framework over several years.91 The resulting regulation
provides a framework whose specificity itself combats lingering
banking problems facing China today—lack of transparency,
threats of corruption, and even failure to fully comply with
international regulations.92
This is not to suggest Basel II contains overly rigid and
unbending provisions requiring absolute submission of the
world’s banks.93 Allowances for cultural and market differences
lend the framework a degree of flexibility necessary for
widespread acceptance and global compliance.94 The Basel
Committee granted China and other developing countries an
extended timeline for fully implementing the framework in
recognition of the unfairness that would result in immediately
holding those states to the same standard as developed
countries.95 Pillar 1 of the Basel II framework even includes
90. See Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I and II, at 12, 26 and 158, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm.
91. Basel II, supra note 10, Introduction. See also History of the Basel
Committee and its Membership, BIS.COM, http://www.bis.g/bcbs/history.htm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2010) (talking about the membership, the development process and
testing) [hereinafter Basel Committee History].
92. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession
Saga, 15 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1469, 1534 (2000) (“[T]he Chinese government has
failed to implement fully the 1992 US-China trade agreements . . . because its trade
laws and regulations lack ‘transparency’ and non-tariff barriers still exist.”); PENG,
supra note 6, at 12, 16 (detailing several recent high profile corruption cases in
China involving SBBCs).
93. See Basel II, supra note 10, Introduction, ¶ 6 (“It is not the Committee’s
intention to dictate the form or operational detail of banks’ risk management policies
and practices.”).
94. Id. § 2 (“The Committee expects its members to move forward with the
appropriate adoption procedures in their respective countries.”).
95. See The Responses to the Press by the Senior Official of the China Banking
Regulatory Commission on Issues Relating to the New Capital Accord, CBRC.GOV.CN
(2004), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=468 (explaining
that “[Basel II] places the one-size-fit approach with a menu of options for countries
to choose for calculation of capital adequacy.”).
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alternative methods for calculating adequate capitalization and
developing risk management depending on the type of market
being regulated.96 Yet, even when providing alternative
methods, Basel II details each plan with equal specificity. The
Basel Committee’s ability to account for such differences
illuminates the benefits of solely focusing on banking
regulations.97 Obviously, the Committee deals exclusively with
such issues, but this expertise allows it to be more specific than
the WTO, which also oversees banking issues, though under its
much larger purview of global trade regulation.98 Both
organizations play important roles in shaping Chinese economic
and trade policies.99 Unlike the broad WTO regulations,
however, the Basel Committee’s framework narrows its
regulatory gaze on specific aspects of banking, making it all the
more effective in that area.100 With its sights trained on the
Middle Kingdom, Basel II’s level of detail helps China overcome
problems with its banking system and avoid historic roadblocks
to implementation of international standards.101
1. Capital Adequacy Specifically and Simply Defined
The specificity of Basel II begins with its simply stated
minimum capital requirement: “The total capital ratio must be
no lower than 8%.”102 For China, this ratio provides a
straightforward standard by which the China Banking
Regulatory Commission and outside investors can evaluate
96. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I, ¶ at 15 (“The Committee proposes to
permit banks a choice between two broad methodologies for calculating their capital
requirements for credit risk”).
97. See Basel Committee History, supra note 83, available at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (stating that the Committee pursues “two basic
principles: that no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and
that supervision should be adequate.”).
98. See What is the WTO?, WTO.ORG,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (stating that “The goal
[of the WTO] is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers
conduct their business.”).
99. WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession, WTO.ORG,
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm (quoting Minister Moore
who said that “Now [China’s] economy will be subjected to the rules-based system of
the WTO, something which is bound to enhance global economic cooperation . . . .”).
100. See Basel Committee History, supra note 83.
101. See supra note 13, at 114–15 (noting China’s problems complying with
WTO transparency requirements).
102. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar 1, at 12.
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SOCBs.103 Basel II presents its ultimate goal in the first
paragraph, though greater complexity and specificity lie in the
calculation of that 8% standard.104 Guidelines for determining
the standard’s two main components–capital assets and riskweighted assets–comprise the remaining one-hundred and fortyfive pages of the First Pillar.105 The sheer volume of material
evinces the complex risk calculation of Basel II compared to
Basel I, the whole of which totaled twenty-six pages.106
While the “central focus” of Basel I was credit risk, Basel II
adds operational risk and market risk in the total risk
calculation.107 Each category of risk receives full explanation of
the numerous factors banks must take into account in order to
properly assess their risk and thereby adequately capitalize
themselves.108 The provisions governing calculation of
operational risk provide three avenues for calculation–the basic
indicator approach, the standardized approach, and the
advanced measurements approaches–and sets out specific
parameters for each.109 For example, in laying out the second
most stringent approach, the standardized approach, the
framework states that banks must divide their activities into
eight distinct categories, demands they calculate total capital
charge with a multiple-year average, and even provides an
“alternative standardized approach” in the footnotes.110
2. Devil Is (Not) In the Details: Specificity as a Defense Against
Corruption
Basel II and its documentation requirements prevent
SOCBs from only seeming to comply with the regulations.111
Even after WTO accession, the Central Chinese Government

103. Id. (stating several times the need for proper documentation and ability of
supervisors and investors to have access to the documents).
104. Id. at 15–157 (detailing proper methods for risk calculations).
105. Id.
106. See International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards (Basel I) (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?nofram
es=1.
107. See id.; Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I at 12.
108. See Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I (detailing proper methods for risk
calculations).
109. Id.
110. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I at 139–40.
111. See KRISTOFF & WUDUNN, supra note 28.
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used prudential loopholes in the WTO’s Annex of Financial
Services to justify certain loans that banking branching
restrictions and approval procedures would not otherwise
allow.112 Through detailing the specific requirements of capital
adequacy and risk management, Basel II shrinks such loopholes
and provides a level of defense against corrupt directors.113 Its
intricately planned framework and narrow focus on capital
adequacy leave little room for corrupt or even ineffective
directors to hide.114 Additionally, Basel II’s single focus demands
a high level of banking expertise, which guards against wholly
political appointments of SOCB directors.115
The Commercial Banking Law and the Law Governing the
People’s Bank of China deserve due credit for divorcing the
government from the banks’ reforms, laying the groundwork for
Basel II.116 The statutes added teeth to the regulations and
imposed stiff penalties on managers who improperly used bank
funds or engaged in other types of corruption.117 Those 2003
amendments also created the China Banking Regulatory
Committee (CBRC), which now oversees all banking, and
implemented the Basel II framework through a series of
guidelines and regulations.118 Basel II’s focus on capital
adequacy provides the CBRC with a concise measurement by
which it can judge SOCBs and evaluate corrupt managers.119
Instead of capricious political judgments or nebulous statutes
112. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 114–15 (blaming the
vagueness of this WTO provision for enabling China to circumvent its own
restrictions and procedures).
113. See Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar II (granting supervisors the ability to
demand documentation of methodologies of bank managers and directors).
114. Id.; Cf. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13 (claiming that the
adequate capitalization requirements are too narrow and thus ineffectual).
115. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I. See also PENG, supra note 6 (noting the
political nature of past banking directors appointments).
116. See Lifa Fa Law on Commercial Banks (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 2003).
117. Id.
118. See Decision on Institutional Restructuring of the Government Agencies
under the State Council, April 28, 2003; Law on Banking Regulation and
Supervision (2003) (granting the CBRC unambiguous powers over the banking
industry); The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by
China’s Banking Sector (2007) available at
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=200703190C335698
6BEDAB3AFF45DA32BF983500.
119. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I (detailing the requirement that must be
included in any bank’s capital adequacy calculation methods).
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that used to govern Chinese banks, Basel II’s beacon of capital
adequacy slices through previously murky regulations, and
exposes corrupt and inadequate bank managers and
underperforming SOCBs.120
3. Basel II Specificity Eases Implementation
Chinese laws often promote grand ideals such as “safety,
fluidity and efficiency,” but fail to explain how banks and
businesses should attain them.121 While the Basel Committee
commits itself to grand goals, in Basel II it provides a specific
blueprint for countries and banks to follow and reach those
broad goals.122
Firstly, the specificity produces a type of ready-made
regulatory system that works for their market and history and
complies with the regulatory provisions.123 Furthermore, Basel
II restricts the government’s ability to alter the regulations
beyond recognition or undermine the larger goals of
standardized international regulations.124 Such details benefit
China since the framework provides not only goals, but specific
methods for attaining those goals.125
In a letter to the Chairman of the Basel Committee, the
CBRC expressed China’s great desire to implement the new
standards, but also pleaded for assistance in designing proper

120. See Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision (2003) (Article 4 listing
“compliance, openness, impartiality and efficiency” as the guiding principles of
supervision, but then failing to expand upon them).
121. See YANG, supra note 15.
122. See Basel II, supra note 15, at Introduction, ¶ 4 (“The fundamental
objective of the Committee’s work to revise the 1988 Accord has been to develop a
framework that would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the
international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital
adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among
internationally active banks.”).
123. Basel II, supra note 10, at Introduction, ¶ 7 (“[F]ramework also allows for a
limited degree of national discretion in the way in which each of these options may
be applied, to adapt the standards to different conditions of national markets.”).
124. See US TRADE REP., 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO
COMPLIANCE (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REP. TO CONG.] (noting significant gaps
between Chinese commitments under the WTO and corresponding laws).
125. See Letter to Jaime Caruana, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Chair, (July 31, 2003), available at
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=466
(stating that “the risk management of [Chinese] banks has begun to evolve at an
accelerated pace.”) [hereinafter CBRC Letter].
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and adequate methods for applying them to their relatively
simplistic yet evolving banking system.126 More than Basel I,
WTO regulations or Chinese banking laws, Basel II provides the
techniques and principles needed for obtaining the globally
recommended ends of standardized, adequate and risk-sensitive
capitalization.127 In China, such specificity assists in mitigating
a wide array of banking and business regulatory problems,
particularly those related to improving corporate governance.128

B. BASEL II’S DOCUMENTATION AND TRANSPARENCY
REQUIREMENTS129
Lack of transparency remains a major complaint from
states and businesses doing business with China, especially
those engaging with SOCBs.130 The more China opens up its
economy to trade, however, the more other states will demand
that they open up their ledgers and law books.131 Basel II not
only requires greater transparency through its documentation
requirements, but also specifically states the information that
must be documented and who may access it.132
For example, banks must document procedures used for
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Basel II, supra note 10, Introduction.
See supra note 116 (stating that “Basel is more about risk management
than capital regulation . . .”); Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar II at 159 (explaining that
proper supervision and corporate governance are necessary to implement a proper
risk management system).
129. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I at 27, 34, 42, 82 and 86–87 (discussing,
respectively, requirements for legal certainty, implementing qualitative criteria,
standardized procedure, documented divergence from standard rating systems, and
documented rating systems in general).
130. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, at 2–3 (devoting an entire section
dedicated to transparency).
131. See 2007 REP. TO CONG., supra note 124, at 11–12 (“When bilateral dialogue
is not successful, the Administration will not hesitate to employ the full range of
enforcement tools available.”).
132. See Basel II, supra note 10, at Pillar II, ¶ 91 (highlighting that “individual
assessments should be available to both domestic and foreign institutions”).
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their chosen risk-weighing methodology, the designs of their
ratings systems, reasons for employing multiple ratings
systems, and processes utilized in developing their ratings
systems, just to name a few.133 These detailed requirements
alert China, and all Basel Committee members, not only to the
high level of documentation required, but also to the formula
used for risk calibration.134 Comparatively, the WTO accession
agreement merely lists vague areas where documentation
should be provided upon request of another member country.135
IV. HOW DO YOU SAY “MINIMUM CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS” IN CHINESE?: TRANSLATING BASEL II
INTO CHINESE LAW
The demand for supervisory review fomented the creation of
the CBRC in 2003.136 One of the first acts of the CBRC was
releasing regulations incorporating Basel II principles.137
Recently, that organization set forth guidelines for accelerated
wholesale implementation of Basel II in all Chinese banks.138
A. BASEL BEFORE BASEL – BASEL II IMPLEMENTATION FIRST
PHASE
Just months before the Basel Committee released Basel II,
the CBRC issued capital adequacy provisions titled, “Regulation
Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks.”139 The
regulation contains key components of Basel II, such as
disclosure of information requirements and supervisory review
133. See id. at ¶ 43 (detailing the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to credit
risk, for example).
134. Id.
135. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, at 3 (“Replies to requests for information
shall generally be provided within 30 days after receipt of a request.”).
136. See generally Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking Regulation
and Supervision (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31,
2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docVIEW.jsp?docID=2916.
137. See Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks
(promulgated by the Chinese Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Feb. 27, 2004, effective
Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=558
(implicitly adopting Basle II guidelines) [hereinafter Capital Adequacy Regulation].
138. See
Guidelines, supra note 118 (establishing a timetable for Basel II
implementation).
139. Capital Adequacy Regulation, supra note 137.

LUEHR

192

fixed

12/10/2010 2:12 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 20:1

provisions,140 but does not mirror the complexity of capital
adequacy calculation of Basel II.141 On the day the provision was
released, a senior CBRC official spoke to the press about the
goals of the regulation, citing Basel I and Basel II as the bases
for the Chinese regulations, though admitting that the
“Regulations” are transitional.142 This approach to Basel II
shows the willingness of the Chinese government and the
SOCBs to adopt better corporate governance standards, and
some success has been achieved.143 Most importantly, these
regulations prepared SOCBs and the banking industry as a
whole for the more recent CBRC guidelines advising
implementation of the Basel II framework.144
B. THE FULL BASEL – CBRC IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II AND
RECENT PUSHES FOR FULL COMPLIANCE
In 2007, the CBRC issued “The Guidelines on the
Implementation of the New Basel Accord by China’s Banking
Sector” (“Guidelines”), requiring large-scale banks, with
operational entities in other countries or regions, and including
those banks with a large proportion of international business, to
implement the entire Basel II framework.145 The Guidelines
caution that the “implementation of Basel II . . . should be
proceeded gradually” and SOCBs should refrain from
“irrationally rushing into the implementation.”146 While the
regulations preach some caution, they also impute all the
specific requirements of Basel II, such as the internal ratings
based (“IRB”) approach, onto the large, international banks.147
Instead of translating the provisions into separate regulations,

140.
141.

Id. at Ch. III , Art. 36, Ch. IV., Art. 43.
See id. (using a basic capital adequacy formula, but not the detailed
formulae of risk management put forth in Basel II).
142. Senior official of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
Speaking to the Press on the Newly Issued Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy
of Commercial Banks,
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=506 (last visited, Sept.
25, 2010).
143. See Zhuang, Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, supra note 7
(detailing progress of reform).
144. See Guidelines, supra note 118. (preparing SOCBs for the implementation
of Basel II).
145. Id.
146. Id. at II.ii.
147. See id. at IV (imputing the internal ratings approach to risk assessment).
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the guidelines encourage SOCBs to implement Basel II as a
whole.148
Following their principles of methodical implementation,
the 2007 Guidelines essentially gave the large-scale banks with
operational entities in other countries or regions, and those
banks with a large proportion of international business, until
2013 to implement Basel II.149 Later, China surprised the global
banking community by announcing that Chinese banks are
likely to carry out Basel II by the end of 2010,150 perhaps
spurred on by the amazing growth in China’s economy.151 While
full implementation will prove beneficial for the global banking
community, it does raise the question of why China accelerated
their implementation, especially considering the state of the
financial market over the past year. The reasons for the
accelerated implementation also suggest answers to questions
about whether China will in fact be faithful to the commitments
Basel II demands.
V. FULL COMPLIANCE
Much focus on China’s emergence in the global market
focuses on foreign countries’ desire to access the large, and
largely untapped, market.152 On the flipside of that assumption,
China wants to be part of the global market and is willing to
comply with Basel II.153 While deficiencies in labor law
compliance or copyright infringement may not stop a purchaser
from buying goods made in China, banking is a service industry
with different dynamics.154 China needs to address the
148. See id. at III.i (“Those large banks with operational entities in other
countries or regions (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) and with large
proportion of international businesses, should adopt Basel II.”).
149. Id. at V.iii.
150. Chinese Banks to Execute Basel II Before 2010, NANFANG DAILY, July 30,
2009.
151. See Keith Bradsher, China’s Economy Roars Back, While U.S. Still Ails,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at A4 (“The Chinese central bank said the county’s
economy surged at an annual rate of 14.9 percent in the second quarter.”).
152. See JAMES MCGREGOR , ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS, 1–2, (2005) (noting the
great potential of the largely untapped Chinese consumer market).
153. See CBRC Letter, supra note 125 (assuring the Basel Chairman that China
will incorporate Basel II’s risk management provisions).
154. See Ann E. Christoff, The Chinese Automobile Industry and the World
Trade Organization: China’s Non-compliance with WTO Regulations through Its
Subsidizing of Automobile Manufacturers, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 137–
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discrepancies that run throughout its banking system.155
Especially in the wake of the global economic crisis, proper risk
management tops the list of investor and government concerns
regarding the financial industry.156 With Basel II becoming the
standard by which all nations and investors judge risk
management (in its relation to capital adequacy), proper
implementation becomes crucial for China and its SOCBs.157
Thus, the economic benefits of complying with a globally
recognized standard of risk management will reap rewards for
China as it continues its ascendance in the global market.158 As
to why China chose 2009 as the year to push for accelerated
Basel II implementation, we must look to an earlier
international agreement that also brought international
standards to China: WTO accession.159 As mentioned above, the
WTO created the Transitional Regulatory Mechanism as a
special body to oversee Chinese compliance with WTO
standards.160 Over the years, China has confronted allegations
by several countries complaining about lack of compliance.161
China has historically deflected, denied and sometimes
implemented change in the face of such challenges.162

38, 2009 (noting that despite non-compliance, China has still increased its
automobile sales around the world since accession).
155. See generally Lee, supra note 36, at 729 (“The banking system operating in
the CEA (Chinese Economic Area) needs work. China must develop a more stable
banking system.”).
156. See Stephen Labatton, Fed Plans to Vet Banker Pay to Discourage Risky
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004 (“The Federal Reserve is working to ensure that
compensation packages appropriately tie rewards to longer-term performance and
do not create undue risks for the firm or the financial system.”).
157. See Lee, supra note 36, at 728 (“To create a sound and safe financial
integration in the CEA, the implementation of the Basle Accords will be essential.”).
158. See id. at 708 (“Application of the Basle Accords to China’s banking
regulation will allow China to adopt internationally recognized standards of banking
supervision which, in turn, will encourage foreign banks to conduct business in
China.”).
159. See generally WTO Protocol, supra note 50 (describing China’s accession to
the World Trade Organization).
160. Id. (detailing the TRM).
161. See World Trade Org., Disputes by Country/Territory,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 23, 2010) (listing China as a respondent in twenty claims).
162. See World Trade Org., China: Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds363_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2010) (providing an example of China’s willingness to adopt
recommendations and rulings).
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Significant to China’s Basel II implementation is that the eight
year period under which China must answer to the TRM ends
this year.163 This does not, however, mean China is completely
free from WTO scrutiny, for in 2011, or possibly 2010, China
will undergo its final TRM review.164 Considering multiple
countries have raised issues during each year of China’s
membership and this will be the final review, it is logical to
presume China will come under stricter scrutiny than the
previous years.
While this final review does pose a challenge for China, it
also represents an opportunity. As mentioned above, over the
past few years Chinese businesses, including SOCBs, and the
government, have recognized the need for greater corporate
governance.165 If China is able to prove its banking industry
meets the rigid Basel II standards, it should lead to better risk
management.166 Firstly, Basel II compliance indicates a robust
and modern financial system, which would answer questions
about China’s ability to fully modernize a key industry,
particularly with regards to SOCBs.167 Secondly, and more
importantly, given the context of WTO review, full Basel II
implementation would demonstrate China’s willingness and
ability to comply with international standards, which has long
been a question mark for the Middle Kingdom.168 Since a
comprehensive TRM review will almost certainly raise questions
of banking, and about SOCBs in particular, China is seizing the
global stage to display its ability to reform and prove to the
world it can be a trusted and sophisticated financial service
partner.169
163.
164.
165.

See id.
See id.
See Guidelines, supra note 118. (concluding that Basel II is “consistent with
the CBRC’s supervisory concept of principle based supervision”).
166. See CBRC Letter, supra note 125 (“We all believe that this rewarding
exercise will yield long-term benefits both in terms of improved capital regulation
and most importantly, better management of risks in banking.”).
167. See Bhala, supra note 45, at 1471 (noting that the Middle Kingdom is a
second-rank power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theater”).theater”).
168. See id. at 1470 (“No country currently seeking WTO membership—Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and Russia, for example—could possibly raise a more complex array of
issues than the People’s Republic of China.”).
169. See Lee, supra note 36, at 727 (“If [China] fully adopts the Basle Accords,
investors seeking to optimize the return on their investment would be free to buy,
sell and trade in financial assets through the region.”).
170. The Basel III regulations were released as this article was going to print.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the best efforts of countries such as China and
organizations such as the Basel Committee, the ultimate test of
international standards remains the marketplace. Basel II
represents a common standard by which all banks, regardless of
country of financial system, can be assessed. The risk
management standards in particular will provide greater
uniformity of practices throughout Chinese SOCBs that should
mitigate, or at least make more difficult, the corrupt practices
that have brought harm not only to the banks’ customers, but
also to the reputation of the Chinese banking system as a whole.
The government’s desire to voluntarily address these issues and
implement Basel II should prove encouraging to those looking to
170
do business with the Big Four in the future.
Questions still remain, especially considering whether or
not the Central Government can be trusted to take its own
members to task if and when violations occur. Aside from the
financial and political impracticability of a watchdog
organization, the best free market systems should regulate
themselves. Of course, no system is perfect, and regulation is
necessary, but concern about national integrity, security, as well
as a greater familiarity with one’s domestic system make host
countries perhaps the best candidates to regulate their
systems.171 Furthermore, Chinese SOCBs and the Central
Government have a unique relationship. The regulators want to
enforce the rules that have been domestically ratified. At the
same time, the bank owners or majority shareholder wants the
bank to be as financially free as possible and thus as profitable
as it can be. With Chinese SOCBs, the regulators and majority
shareholders are one in the same: the Central Chinese
government. While this does open the possibility of regulators
shirking responsibility for profit, the ultimate goal of increased
international banking business should provide proper
The CRBC stated that they see no short-term impact on China from the new
regulations. See Esther Fung, China Banking Regulator: Basel III Won't Have
Immediate Impact on China Banks, FOX BUSINESS Sept. 16, 2010,
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/09/16/china-banking-regulator-basel-iiiwont-immediate-impact-china-banks/

171. See Basel II, supra note 10, at Pillar II, ¶ 722 (“Supervisors are expected to
evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital needs relative to their risks and
to intervene, where appropriate.”).
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motivation for the government to fulfill its dual roles with equal
diligence.
As in any industry, it is difficult to predict what future
changes will occur in the global financial market. New financial
products emerge constantly, some good (ATMs and online
banking), some not (sub-prime housing loans). Whatever
emerges, the global community must respond, and
implementing standards such as Basel II prepare the world to
better address changes and problems as they arise. One of the
largest question marks moving is China itself. Though market
forces and international pressure can effect some change, the
increasing power of China may cause China to grow impervious
or indifferent to the cries of the outside world. For this reason,
the internalization of certain standards, such as the Basel II
accords, but also those in a variety of areas, may be the best
instrument for ensuring global stability in the future. This is
not to suggest some nefarious plot of world domination by
China, but we must acknowledge that the shifting of global
powers has rarely been easy or peaceful.

